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Abstract
The first half of this article provides a brief overview of two respective projects concerning 
traumatic bereavement, in which religious faith appeared to feature amid a constellation of 
significant coping and sense-making mechanisms for survivors. After presenting some illustrative 
examples of the kind of data produced in the course of our research, the second half of the article 
develops a retrospectively critical appraisal of our data collection and corresponding analysis 
practices. In questioning the extent to which our accounts of our participants’ accounts can be 
considered adequate representations of social order, we critically explore the relative potential 
of ‘reflexivity’ for bridging the experiential gap between researchers and participants. Taken 
together, these reflections prompt a return to the salutary question: what counts as sociologically 
‘see-able’?
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Introduction
Researching violence, bereavement, and mourning inevitably leads us to recognisable, 
yet unfamiliar stories. We are forced to negotiate moments during our fieldwork which 
confront our own life worlds. Some stories we hear may even seem ubiquitous, yet, if 
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anything, serve to highlight the ontological chasms that exist between us and our partici-
pants. Religion and faith, as qualitative features of social narratives, may stand as one 
exemplar (among many) of this much broader ‘problem’ of interpretation. Based on ret-
rospective reflection on past fieldwork and interview data, this article grapples with our 
shared concern that experiential reality for ‘believers’ and their intrinsic ways of being in 
the world are too often abstracted into familiar categories of analysis.
Interactions between researchers and participants with either no ‘shared faith’ in a par-
ticular religious deity or spiritual doctrine or, conversely, no ‘faith shared’ at all by one 
side in any religious or spiritual worldview are common and deserve our attention. At 
best, under these circumstances, we might attempt to convey stories of religious experi-
ence as they were conveyed to us without necessarily understanding or reconciling them 
with our own beliefs. At worst, we might dilute them within our analyses or perhaps even 
abandon them altogether, truly in bad faith from an ethical standpoint, for fear of ‘getting 
it wrong’ or misinterpreting and misrepresenting experiences divergent from our own. Yet 
despite these apparent difficulties, stories told between members of one religion and 
another or, in our case, between participants with a religious or spiritual conviction and 
researchers without one, are rendered comprehensible (i.e. understandable).
This article aims to explore how we might navigate the unfamiliar and how we might 
engage with material that we do not necessarily identify with on a personal, spiritual, or 
ideological level. It contains five main sections, which are structured as follows.
The first gives a brief overview of two studies that we conducted, respectively, and 
from which the interview data we consider here and present later in the article derives. 
Our shared curiosity about the contingencies and dynamics of qualitative research, 
including the methodological questions it provokes, led to a series of conversations con-
cerning rapport with participants, conversation topics covered during interviews, and 
data analysis processes. One problem, or interest, each of us returned to was how to deal 
with and situate unfamiliar (non)knowledge within our fieldwork practices and interview 
data after the event. By retrospective virtue of such questions, we hope our puzzlement 
can prove constructive, if not exactly resolvable, epistemically speaking.
The second section presents a series of extracts from our data to simply illustrate the 
kinds of experiences prompting these thoughts. Despite their fascinating content and 
conventional ‘feel’ as segments of narrative, our inability to fully identify with partici-
pants’ stories only heightened a perceived tension between faithful data collection and 
subsequent representation.
The third section explores the fact that, despite this perceived tension, religious narra-
tives were nonetheless comprehensible and decipherable products of our research inter-
actions. Here, we critically ask whether the brief extracts and analyses given in section 
‘Background to our respective studies’ represent adequate accounts of our participants’ 
experiences.
The fourth section considers how practices of reflexivity, positionality, and self-cri-
tique have become one stock methodological answer to this question. Reflexivity, as 
Lynch (2000) argues, is often hailed as a ‘methodological virtue and source of superior 
insight, perspicacity or awareness’ (p. 26). While its proponents have pointed to its 
emancipatory and critical potential, we argue that the practice of reflexivity is in fact 
ordinary and mundane; it does not, in this case, carry inherent methodological value 
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alone for grappling with faith and religious worldviews, or for wholly reconstructing 
participants’ partial or unchallenged accounts.
In light of these arguments, the final section considers alternative research design 
strategies we might employ to resist methodological tendencies that create detached, 
‘expert’ knowledge only of epistemic value to social scientific communities. One way in 
which we encourage readers to question unfamiliar narratives and seek further clarity in 
their research is through ongoing critical engagement with the ‘do no harm’ principle 
typically followed to satisfy institutional ethical approval. The article concludes by 
reflecting on the gap between comprehension and comprehensibility in social research, 
returning to the salutary question: what counts as sociologically ‘see-able’?
Background to our respective studies
Making sense of material that we do not necessarily identify with on a personal, spiritual, 
or ideological level is, of course, a task potentially faced by all researchers. Our focus on 
religion stems from similar experiences we shared during our respective doctoral research 
projects which were completed in 2018. William McGowan’s research centred on 
bereaved families and survivors of political violence and terror attacks who are engaged 
in storytelling and dialogue workshops at The Tim Parry Johnathan Ball Foundation for 
Peace, a non-governmental organisation (NGO) based in Warrington, England. Elizabeth 
Cook focused on the experiences of anti-violence campaigners affiliated with an NGO 
called Mothers Against Violence, who have been affected primarily by violent crime in 
Manchester, among other cities in the UK. Both projects explored traumatic bereave-
ment utilising participant observation and in-depth interviews as primary data collection 
methods. Each project was approved by Ethics Committees at our respective institutions 
and informed, written consent was provided by all participants; all respondents’ names 
used here are pseudonyms.
Our reflections on interview topics, rapport with participants, and data analysis pro-
cesses led to recurrent conversations about how closely we felt we had been able to 
understand and represent our participants’ experiences in our finished PhDs. Several 
shared themes naturally emerged across our projects, but it was the way in which some 
participants framed their experiences of, and responses to, violence in religious or spir-
itual ways that intrigued us. Neither of us shared a religious conviction with our partici-
pants, nor did we want to ignore or overlook the significance of their stories. We recalled 
instances where participants would speak at-length about religious scripture, or transcen-
dental experiences, to which we could only listen and nod, simultaneously feeling pangs 
of inadequacy and an all-too-familiar sense of ‘imposter syndrome’ (Breeze, 2018).
Our data were collected and eventually written-up relatively ‘unproblematically’, but 
we harboured frustrations at our lack of shared knowledge with interviewees. So why 
should it be then, sociologically speaking, that we negotiated these research processes 
with simultaneous ease and difficulty? In making sense of this question, we are not occu-
pied with religion exclusively, but also with questions of ontology, epistemology, ethics, 
and reflexivity more broadly.
Religion, of course, continues to occupy a central space within sociology. While it is 
beyond our scope to offer a protracted discussion of this classic and contemporary his-
tory (though see, inter alia, Horii, 2018; Smith et al., 2013; Spickard, 2017), suffice it to 
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say that debates about religion vis-a-vis knowledge, objectivity, science, tradition, and 
belief have not abated in the 21 century. According to some histories, science and tech-
nologies associated with modernity may have undermined traditional religious practice 
and belief, creating an erroneous intellectual dichotomy between science as rational, 
modern, and reasoned and religion as ‘parochial and unscientific’ (Spalek and Imtoual, 
2008: 2; see also Thomas, 1971). Other analyses reveal the intriguing debt owed to pre-
sociological theologies by contemporary social sciences (Burdziej, 2014). Conventional 
approaches to the ‘religious/secular’ dichotomy within sociologies of religion, particu-
larly within social constructionist methodologies, have often favoured bracketing ques-
tions of the sacred when dealing with religious experience empirically – this forming the 
basis of Peter Berger’s widely cited ‘methodological atheism’ (Cantrell, 2016; Porpora, 
2006). Despite not sharing a religious conviction with our participants, we found this 
familiar dichotomy to be unhelpful and reductive and, consequently, this style of brack-
eting inadequate and superficial.
Following Porpora (2006), who offers a methodological critique of Berger’s work on 
religion, subsequent conversations and retrospective (re)analysis of our data have been 
partly shaped by the alterative notion of ‘methodological agnosticism’. While Berger’s 
work is not discredited wholesale by Porpora, it is scrutinised for setting aside supernatu-
ral, transcendental, or sacred experiences in favour of a ‘value free’ social (i.e. not psy-
chic) science. A Christian Lutheran himself, Berger’s writings on religion were both 
illuminating and changing, as he adapted his approach to empirical study and knowledge 
for both sociological and theological audiences throughout his career (Cantrell, 2016; 
Porpora, 2006). An alternative methodological agnosticism would dictate that experi-
ences pointing to religious or spiritual beliefs and attitudes, seemingly invisible to the 
researcher, ‘must at least be explored rather than set aside’ (Porpora, 2006: 70). Examples 
of this principle are not confined to the quiet, modest, and arguably individualistic intro-
spection alluded to later in this article, but are found in both Elisha (2011) and Luhrmann’s 
(2012) studies of public and communal evangelism (for an excellent discussion of these 
works and their ontological treatment of God see also Bialecki, 2014). This sentiment 
seemed to capture our desire of hearing our participants (as opposed to simply listening 
to them), and our simultaneous lack of understanding and occasional reticence towards 
their religious narratives.
Consequently, we believe that there is value in revisiting and critically reflecting on 
our data and fieldwork experiences by flagging up their methodological deficiencies. 
One intention is to highlight those ostensibly direct empirical examples of ‘non-knowl-
edge’ that we encounter during our fieldwork. As we will try to convey in doing so, the 
‘problem’ of religion for social research or of not sharing religious experiences with 
participants is, in many respects, not at all a problem as such, at least not in the funda-
mental ways described above. What both authors experienced during their respective 
fieldwork encounters were narratives that presented themselves in simultaneously recog-
nisable and yet inaccessible ways.
Narrative extracts about religious experience
Critically reflecting on the suitability of our data collection and analyses completed at 
the time, the following three subsections illustrate some of the kinds of experiences 
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described to us. As we argue later in the article, these extracts raise a series of methodo-
logical questions, both inclusive and independent of religiosity. This level admittance of 
both the natural (i.e. observable) and supernatural, neither asserting nor precluding either 
(Porpora, 2006: 58), represents the first stage of the methodological agnosticism 
described above, opening up an ample space in which to critique our accounts of our 
participants’ accounts later in the article.
June
June, an anti-violence campaigner, shared the story of the loss of her son who was shot 
dead during a wave of inner-city gun violence. She described how faith, belief, and reli-
gion had come to inform her reading of this tragic event. Speaking about the night that 
her son was shot, June described hearing what she believes now to be ‘God’s voice’ urg-
ing her not to let her son leave the house that evening. Expressing her role in the after-
math of her son’s death in terms such as ‘calling, ‘sacrifice’, and ‘fate’, she reflected that 
‘by the time my son was killed I was ready for what God had called me to do’.
While religion featured centrally within June’s narrative, there were periodic, implicit 
reminders of the gap that existed between our assumed worldviews, as the following pas-
sage suggests:
June: He never came back, yeah? And every time I think about that, I think, you know something 
June, if you had obeyed, your son would have been still alive. But again, because the Bible tells 
me all things are working together for my good . . . So, whether I obey or not obey God is still 
. . . because what he’s saying is I will work it for your good. It might look not so good, but he 
said I will work it for your good. He said all things work together for those who love the Lord 
and are called accordant to His purpose.
June spoke for nearly 4 hours about these experiences, habitually referring to reli-
gious passages, readings, and personal meditations that she had learned over her lifetime. 
She was, of course, not alone in orienting conversations about traumatic bereavement 
around her faith. Our attempts to make sense of the ‘data’ that we had amassed, however, 
were also influenced by feelings of confusion and uncertainty over how exactly to under-
stand these unfamiliar meanings, passages, and stories from scripture.
A secular ‘reading’ of June’s story might, for example, see this as a tale of coping and 
recovery, where the role of faith serves as a defence mechanism against the extreme 
distress of violence. Indeed, it might serve such functions, providing a narrative of com-
fort and solace at a time of traumatic upheaval and disruption or, for others, represent a 
moment of crisis which confronts faith and confirmation.
Nevertheless, reducing religion and faith to a set of more familiar (for the researchers) 
psychological and emotional phenomena seems speculative and abstract. We note as an 
aside that much criminological research around violence, for example, often displays a 
tendency to see the importance of religion only in how it manifests in preventive factors, 
desistance from offending, and as an instrumental coping mechanism in the aftermath of 
violence (see Adamczyk et al., 2017). Does this risk rationalising religion in aid of 
accepted (secular) standards of analytical procedure and knowledge practices? The lan-
guage of ‘calling’, ‘vessel’, and ‘sacrifice’ employed by June and others to describe their 
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experiences sometimes created confusion and ambiguity over how to faithfully and 
respectfully represent unfamiliar experiences, though we would soon come to ask a 
seemingly more basic methodological question: how far were we really able to represent 
any experiences described to us? This question seemed compounded, given the religious 
tenet of June’s narrative and those that follow, our lack of shared faith, and the modern, 
secular roots of so many of our sociological canons.
Practically speaking, the extract above also contains an obvious interpretive ambigu-
ity: is it life itself, insofar as this represents God’s plan, that ‘might look not so good’ (to 
June, the believer, whose son has lost his life as part of this higher plan)? Or is June, in 
fact, performing quite a deliberate awareness-turn; namely that the idea of someone 
believing in such a seemingly unjust system of monotheistic reasoning ‘might look not 
so good’ (to the researcher, the assumed non-believer – this being one possible assump-
tion June may have held of Researcher B, itself riddled with more complexity than such 
an assumption would likely reconcile in the moment)? Without seeking clarification at 
the time for fear of interrupting or disrupting June’s interview ‘flow’, such subtle, ordi-
nary language turns can be difficult to retrospectively reconstruct – an obvious short-
coming we explore further below.
Lynn
Perhaps similarly difficult to comprehend is Lynn’s account. Lynn’s husband Jim was 
killed in Northern Ireland during a bombing campaign in the early 1990s. For several 
years after his death Lynn would reflect on how merciless her husband’s assailants had 
been, ‘meticulously planning every minute, from occupation of this house to the minute 
the bomb exploded. I just couldn’t understand how human beings could do that’ (Lynn).
We reproduce part of her account here to show how she came to experience transcen-
dental connections with her husband several years after his murder. While the visions 
and experiences she recounts may be hard to grasp from a secular, worldly viewpoint, her 
story was compelling, coherent, and moving – immanently comprehensible (understand-
able), if not entirely comprehensive (complete):
Lynn: I firmly believe in a life hereafter. I was always a bit sceptical [laughs] about spirits and 
ghosts and all that sort of stuff but now I fully believe in a presence because Jim has come back 
to me a few times. Now, he hasn’t come back to me now for the past two years. [. . .] I was 
having horrific nightmares about Jim, er, being all stuck together wrong . . . you know, foot 
sticking out of here and his head down there and . . . it was horrific, it really was horrific. One 
night I went to bed and I thought I can’t go to sleep because I’m going to have these nightmares 
again. I propped myself on my pillows and I took out my book and my glasses and I looked up 
and Jim was standing by the bedroom door and I thought . . . ‘aye right’ [expressing disbelief], 
so put my head down in my book again and I looked up again and Jim was still there. It was him 
just standing there and he had on the grey cardigan that he had on him when they [his 
perpetrators] took him away. He just looked at me and he held out his arms and he says, he 
always called me ‘girl’, he says ‘look at me girl, I’m ok now you go to sleep’ so I thought to 
myself ‘oh, right ok’ and I have never had a nightmare again, never! I was at church that Sunday 
evening and they were doing a healing service and in the healing service the priest was standing 
up in the pulpit and he was preaching about on the last day we will all arise perfect and I thought 
there you go. That’s Jim telling me again that he’s alright. He’s alright where he is and that I’m 
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to continue on in my life and do the best I can and that, that was one of the good times when he 
appeared to me.
Lynn’s references to Jim reappearing after his death punctuated our interview. She did 
not speak of these interactions in overtly religious terms, but in matter-of-fact, colloquial 
ways, indicating, it seemed, no required input or understanding from the interviewer. The 
stories that she shared exhibited quite ordinary, conventional characteristics, even though 
their content described out-of-the-ordinary experience (Sacks, 1992: 215–221). This is 
difficult to decipher, however, when we ‘read’ the data without sufficient context:
Lynn: I was lying in bed reading and this wall opposite my bed lit up. I put the book down and 
the wall was like a meadow full of flowers and they were all pastel coloured, lilacs and pinks 
and pale yellows. There was a path coming down, winding down the meadow and this figure 
was moving down the path . . . as it got to the bottom of the path I realised it was Jim and he 
had his arms out like that [gestures]. I went to get up and he waved me to sit down, you know, 
as much as saying ‘no, no you’re alright’ and he turned and he started walking back up the path 
again and he waved. I could see his back and I’m waving like that there and I thought I’m never 
gonna see Jim again.
Visions reportedly experienced by Lynn certainly exhibited worldly and practical 
consequences, including the very conversation we were having. The above extract is 
taken from a section of our interview in which Lynn described forging a relationship with 
her new partner. Taken as a sign that she was now safe and cared for in a loving relation-
ship, the story about Jim’s final appearance was used as one way of describing this newly 
formed relationship. Lynn implied that she felt conflicted about starting a new relation-
ship, speaking at-length about how she and her new partner lived separately, found it 
important to have their own spaces, and that she would never see herself as ‘Jim’s widow’ 
but always as ‘Jim’s wife’. She discussed this earlier in our interview, but when it came 
to her experiences of seeing Jim, she once again oriented her discussion to this new 
relationship:
Do you know my interpretation of that [seeing Jim walking away for the final time]? I have 
now met someone who will not shit me around or do anything to hurt me, who will look after 
me, so he [Jim] doesn’t need to look after me anymore.
Anne and Kevin
Anne and Kevin, whose daughter was killed during the 2005 ‘7/7’ attacks in London, 
explicitly described circumstances which renewed and fortified their Christian faith:
Kevin:  Strength, comfort and rediscovering our faith was a very important part 
of that because, if we’re gonna be honest, faith hadn’t played possibly so 
big a part of our lives for many years. We’d both of us sort of wandered.
Anne:  Yes, it’s difficult when, in, it’s most difficult to sustain your faith in middle 
years with a family, a job and just the everyday things of life. What losing 
Lauren did was strip away everything extraneous and left you with the 
absolute basics of survival, as it were, to survive, to survive that 
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bereavement together and when there was no comfort, no joy left in life, 
the only comfort and joy we found was in our Christian faith. It WAS the 
love of God that kept us going really wasn’t it and He, He has used that to 
bring us to where we are now. He’s definitely brought us to this place 
[referring to their new house] because of the church up on the hill [laughs] 
which is the most lively church I’ve been to since 1979. We never stopped 
going to church but it wasn’t . . .
Kevin:  It didn’t mean quite what it means now. We’d lost the joy.
Anne:  We’ve proved our faith is the love of God and the strength of God to us in 
His, through His son Jesus so . . . I don’t know how smart one can put it.
As this dialogue makes evident, a constellation of practical factors enabled Anne and 
Kevin to reactivate their religious conviction. Moving to a new home has seen Anne and 
Kevin embedded within a new religious community, one which has facilitated, encour-
aged, and supported their faith. Other life course factors have played their part too. 
Retirement has enabled Anne and Kevin to spend increasing amounts of time volunteer-
ing with the local church, its asylum seekers’ refuge programme, and ongoing Christian–
Muslim interfaith forums.
Their desire to combat post-7/7 Islamophobia was also linked by Anne to her experi-
ence of forgiving the perpetrators and accused, a process which she described as the last 
hurdle in moving on from the attack and its debilitating effect on her well-being. This 
occurred during a trial several years later in which three men accused of assisting the 
bombers were acquitted:
Anne: One of the hardest things I’ve ever done . . . I actually was [long pause] led to pray for 
them . . . and I have never done anything quite so hard in my life, it left me feeling absolutely 
exhausted. Whether they were guilty or not was beside the point. I could pray for them because, 
as it came out so clearly in Northern Ireland, there but for the grace of God go I. If we had been 
in those same circumstances, those same people, we would have probably, almost certainly 
done exactly the same thing and so to be able to see these people, who may or may not have 
helped people kill my daughter, in a way as victims themselves, victims of what has been done 
over the years to them by various sources, was very releasing to me.
In finding space to pray for the accused, seeing them as victims of structural forces, we 
might say that for Anne the suicide attackers responsible for 7/7 became ‘transformed 
from being a dangerous other (not to be pitied) to being the subjects of pity’ (Walklate, 
2011: 189). Anne’s own words elsewhere about forgiveness virtually mirror those of 
Agamben’s (1999) on the ‘lacuna’ or absences within testimony. He talks about the proxy 
role played by survivors on behalf of those who die. They cannot speak for the dead since 
they themselves did not experience death, and the dead themselves cannot speak about 
exactly what death is like. Anne’s remarks about forgiveness suggest this lack of ability 
to speak for those who no longer can, which again is articulated through a primarily 
religious lens:
Anne: I don’t have to forgive him [perpetrator] for killing Lauren. Lauren has to do that. That’s 
the dreadful thing about murder, because the person you’ve killed can’t forgive you, in this life 
anyway, but what I have to forgive is my pain and my loss. Now if you keep it to what has been, 
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the trespass against us, against me, the harm that’s been done to me, then it’s much easier to 
forgive and I think that is the problem with people who cannot forgive, is they’re not actually 
analysing what has the harm been to them.
The fact that both perpetrator and victim are dead does not detract from the paralleled 
ways in which Anne rationalises her decision, as a Christian, not to forgive uncondition-
ally. This way of rationalising bereavement via faith and forgiveness necessarily means 
that making sense of loss, coping, and simply ‘going on’ (Giddens, 1991: 39) is under-
stood, for Anne, as something entirely contingent upon ‘looking’ and ‘moving’ forwards 
in time, not revisiting past factual events. Simultaneously forgiving the grief felt directly 
as Lauren’s mother, Anne’s refusal to speak for Lauren discharges her of some responsi-
bility to forgive her perpetrators unconditionally. Forgiveness, at least in a narratological 
sense, constitutes one way in which negative attachments to the past are transcended.
Two features of this narrative confronted us as intriguing and yet difficult to grasp. At 
one level, the requirement for Anne to forgive the perpetrator of her daughter’s murder 
may not be of automatic or primary concern. It is an easy enough concept to grasp, in 
principle, however, if not in practice. Once accepted as a requisite response according to 
religious principles, however, the issue of how one should forgive and who is to be for-
given rears its head. Rather than presenting itself as a religious principle set in stone, here 
we see the kind of interpretive work done among survivors who navigate their under-
standings of forgiveness alongside unimaginable grief. It is not, in short, unconditional, 
nor preordained.
Are these adequate accounts of experience?
Returning to Porpora’s (2006) methodological agnosticism, the ‘truth status’ of the above 
religious experiences is set aside and bracketed, but precisely for the purpose of taking 
it, and the context around it, seriously. While religious experience (i.e. the actual super-
natural quality of the experience) is ‘forever debarred’ (Porpora, 2006: 58) within 
Bergerian methodological atheism and similar approaches to ‘social constructionism’ 
discussed above, this momentary bracketing has no problem in accepting such experi-
ences as ‘real’. But what is meant by real? The question instead becomes: are we, as 
social scientists, providing adequate accounts of experience? Having bracketed the 
supernatural as something potentially true but impossible to know, ontologically speak-
ing for us, what does the natural look like? What natural observations can we make of 
this phenomenon? As we have already intimated, these extraordinary stories are articu-
lated within ordinary social conventions.
A corollary point thus requires justification: what is meant by ‘adequate’, sociologi-
cally speaking? Adequacy, as a methodological benchmark, is differentially located 
across the discipline. Subjecting our data collection and analysis to closer self-scrutiny, 
we found value in subsequently thinking through ethnomethodological approaches to 
problems of social order. In her oft-cited introduction to Harold Garfinkel’s 
Ethnomethodology’s Program, Anne Rawls (2002) explains the methodological ideal 
known as ‘unique adequacy’ (p. 6). This ideal holds that immersion in the situation being 
studied, to the extent that we ‘learn to be competent practitioners of whatever social 
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phenomena’ that represents, means ‘unique adequacy can be assumed for most persons’ 
(Rawls, 2002: 6). This suggests a tacit familiarity with the situation, people, problems, 
actions, and communications in question. However, as Rawls also points out, unique 
adequacy can be difficult to achieve among so-called ‘specialized populations’ (such as 
scientists or police officers) who, in reality, could be encountered through any activities 
beyond the immediately competent participation of researchers. Furthermore, unique 
adequacy might be assumed under certain circumstances but not others. Hence, due to 
our lack of practical familiarity with our participants’ religious worlds, we can only fall 
back on our comprehension of their stories.
Religion or faith was articulated as a major source of support for our participants, often 
providing a comforting or guiding influence when almost all other areas of their lives 
seemed chaotic, lonely, or stressful. Religious faith was said to have been forged by expe-
rience of losing a loved one. The support structures borne from it cut across both indi-
vidual, personal characteristics, and communal dynamics – both serve to mould, and are 
moulded by, religious conviction. However, while the retrospective character of these 
accounts might be illustrative in a Millsian sense (see Rawls, 2002: 6), suggestive of fas-
cinating and moving personal accounts, the data analysis and presentation conventions we 
adopt above (and which are so typical of much qualitative sociology) fail to demonstrably 
reproduce/represent the ordinary quality of our interactions with participants.
For Sacks (1992: 218), even extraordinary, exciting, bizarre, boring, memorable, 
humorous, or upsetting stories are recounted within parameters of ordinary conversa-
tional conventions and are thus recognisable as such. Thus, they were simply ‘ordinary 
stories’ (Sacks, 1992: 215–221) which we simultaneously understood and yet could not 
faithfully relate to as secular researchers – incredibly moving and extraordinary in their 
content, yet assuming a plainly ordinary storied form which we could recognise as such. 
There was no barrier to meaningful interaction or respectful contemplation at Lynn, 
June, Anne, or Kevin’s stories. Indeed, they simply played out as we listened and stood 
on their own terms, an internal coherence all their own, no matter how hard to understand 
or believe they may be to some.
They did, however, reveal something of the ontological space, or lacunae, between 
witness and listener, raising a series of important questions. How close are we really to 
our participants’ narratives at any time? How far can we truly comprehend the experi-
ences they relay to us? If that comprehension does not always extend very far, how much 
of a ‘problem’ does this necessarily pose for our research? Interview data such as ours 
remains problematic for its ‘thinness’; we cannot subsequently reconstruct some innate 
meaning to these stories by appealing to academic strategies of reflexive practice. 
Conversely, our interactions with participants and the ordinary, shared, sense-making 
practices enacted therein constitute the very reflexive stuff of everyday social life.
Unlike, for example, standpoint feminism and participant action derivatives which 
often evince tacit understanding between ‘researcher’ and ‘researched’ (see, inter alia, 
Downes et al., 2014; Harding, 2004; Reinharz, 1992), our fieldwork can only be seen as 
an attempt to hear, and perhaps comprehend, fragments of our participants’ lives (of 
course, we remain relationally located somewhere, as do all researchers of religion, see 
Neitz, 2013). Indeed, when these stories were presented to us, they often raised more 
questions than answers. These questions highlight a series of absences, both literally in 
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our participants’ lives and stories, but also by holding up a mirror to absences in our own 
understanding of spiritual, religious, and transcendental phenomena.
The stories relayed here and our framing of them represent what is broadly compre-
hensible (i.e. understandable) to us. Relatively speaking, the plots are internally coher-
ent even for someone who does not share essential beliefs with the storyteller and, as 
Riessman (2008) notes, hold a rhetorical persuasiveness despite disagreements or dis-
beliefs that we might hold personally. On the contrary, one might reasonably ask what 
is potentially lost from only pursuing the comprehensible in research? Is the compre-
hensible enough for sociological research to aspire to? Afterall, the possible existence 
of tangible non-knowledge, or nichtwissen in Ulrich Beck’s terms (Mythen and 
Walklate, 2013), in fieldwork and knowledge production represent valuable, if oblique, 
sources of understanding and the occasional formation of novel, even paradigmatic 
insights (Kuhn, 1962).
However, there is a tension. At its best, sociology offers descriptions and social expla-
nations of empirical phenomena. Conveying comprehensible experiences is a staple pur-
suit of sociological research: making meaning and sense of experiences other than our 
own for the purpose of identifying patterns, making contributions to policy-relevant 
knowledge and acknowledging harms that have previously gone unheard. Without spe-
ciously imitating the natural sciences (see Latour, 2000), we remain cautious about how 
best to describe and represent things we cannot see or comprehend for ourselves. The 
question, then, throughout our research becomes: what is ‘see-able’? More accurately, 
what qualifies as sociologically ‘see-able’ (Garfinkel, 2016)?
Each of the accounts considered above are selections taken from the eventual prod-
ucts (i.e. interview transcripts) of our participants’ self-conscious agreements to sit down 
and articulate various aspects of their lives with us. For Rawls (2002), this relationship 
between people’s self-conscious and reflexive actions and our attempts to document and 
study them poses a fundamental sociological problem: ‘How is this reflexive character to 
be approached by the analyst in a way that is both empirically adequate and reflexively 
sensitive?’ (p. 48). It is to these matters that we now turn.
Confession as the sociological solution? Reflexivity and the 
virtuous researcher
A common strategy employed by qualitative researchers at this point is to offer a more 
‘reflexive’ account, hopefully filling the gap of comprehension between themselves and 
their participants. Having declared a particular topic important, work is quickly done to 
ensure that the aforementioned processes of data collection and subsequent analyses 
‘make sense’ on their own terms despite differences in positionality, worldviews, or 
extant knowledge between researchers and participants. Often, where data collection and 
analysis experience stumbling blocks as a result, ‘doing reflexivity’ might take the form 
of a declaration of weakness or mitigation concerning analysis. While there are a range 
of ways we might define ‘reflexivity’ (see Lynch, 2000), this summary treatment of 
methodological provisos is one commonly found within the social sciences. Our concern 
here is that such summary understandings of reflexivity elide the fact that as actors mak-
ing practical sense of each other’s lives in mutually recognisable ways, reflexivity is an 
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‘always-already’ present feature of social life (Lynch, 2000; Slack, 2000). This is to 
remember that reflexivity is not a panacea for transparency, truth, or authenticity within 
the research process, nor as Lynch (2000) puts it, does it represent a virtuous source of 
epistemic knowledge.
Sociologically speaking, what even ‘counts’ as data and those aspects of it we deem 
most important revolve around established and maintained social orders. For us, this 
manifested itself in two ways. The first is when mutual understandings of topics were 
forged despite an ostensible lack of commonality between us and our participants. Put 
simply, our inability to faithfully identify with our participants’ experiences did not pre-
vent the practical negotiation of those stories with them in ways rendered intelligible for, 
and by, both parties. This does not mean that we can lay claim to knowing anything of 
our participants’ ontological experiences of religion. The second is where there are 
breakdowns of order or a total misunderstanding between researchers and participants. 
We maintain that these are just as useful, for example, when seeking further clarity or 
explanation from actors in an observed field setting.
Learning from our lack of understanding in aspects of our participant’s lives, while 
simultaneously recognising something of their storied character, has been a first step for 
us in rethinking ‘reflexivity’ in ethnomethodological terms. As Coulon (1995: 22–23) 
insightfully puts it:
Reflexivity refers to the equivalence between describing and producing an action, between its 
comprehension and the expression of this comprehension. ‘Doing’ an interaction is telling it. 
Reflexivity presupposes ‘that the activities whereby members produce and manage settings of 
organized everyday affairs are identical with members’ procedures for making those settings 
“account-able”’ (Garfinkel, 1984 [1967]: 1).
We are not implying that everything will necessarily be insightful or complex, but 
rather that our everyday adjudications of what constitute those things, the information we 
designate ‘data’, and the process of reflecting on our position towards that information 
are inseparable. To suggest otherwise is to cleave our own tacit understandings away 
from our research practice, reserving the term ‘reflexivity’ for a much more specific form 
of doctored and catalogued introspection which is subsequently hailed as evidence of 
rigour and transparency.
Other scholars have expressed similar concerns (Mauthner and Doucet, 2003; Pillow, 
2003) and it is not our contention, in step with Pillow (2003: 177), that we should ‘stop 
talking about our positions’. Rather, we hope that these collective critiques provide better 
understandings of research as an embodied experience, to acknowledge the anxieties that 
accompany this, and to reflect on what this might tell us about the conclusions we reach 
within our research. Of course, ‘our positions’ are ever-present and thus inform research 
practice; a more useful admonition might be to urge each other to ‘stop assigning special 
status to our positions’.
For reflexivity to produce better research we must recognise in situ reflexivity, move 
away from ad hoc rationalisations and towards thick descriptions of these experiences 
that are grounded and built up around relationships, exchanges, and situational interac-
tions in the foreground and the substantive matters and relational practices of commu-
nity, heritage, and ethnicity in the background. To be clear, we are not suggesting that 
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religion or ethnicity themselves are abstract. Instead, we are suggesting that it is through 
relational practice that they are already (and so become) manifest. Speaking of their 
existence is insufficient; how are they understood, misunderstood, or quietly assumed 
within our research practices? If we marginalise such questions in favour of conceptual 
and analytical harmony, we ignore the very fabric of such phenomena.
Narrowing the gap between comprehensible and 
comprehensive experience: methodological implications
This argument carries two practical methodological implications that we consciously 
strive to take seriously in our future research, including around faith and religion.
The first is a more active, inquisitive, and dialogical approach to conducting qualita-
tive fieldwork, be that direct participant observations in physical spaces of worship, for 
example, or the more incidental exploration of religion through interviews and ethno-
graphic activity such as that described here. Our experiences in the field often left us with 
a sense of dissatisfaction and even shame that we could not more fully identify with our 
participants’ life worlds. Yet we still managed to conduct our respective fieldwork with 
relative ease – our incomprehension did not put barriers in the way of doing ‘good 
research projects’ in that regard.
Based on our preceding argument, the problems with this scenario are less to do with 
the practical accomplishment of the fieldwork itself and more to do with our comprehen-
sion of the resulting data. Certainly, from our perspectives and with the benefit of hind-
sight, projects relying solely on interview data invite such ambiguities by design and we 
would be reluctant to replicate them again. Even where this is unavoidable, we believe 
that more can be done in seeking demonstrable clarity from participants to locate the 
importance of religion in the practical accomplishments of everyday life.
Garfinkel’s (1991) principles of respecification serve as important, and unashamedly 
demanding, criteria. Namely, that ‘the reported phenomena cannot be reduced by using 
the familiar reduction procedures in the social science movement without losing those 
phenomena’ and that
the reported phenomena are only inspectably the case. They are unavailable to the arts of 
designing and interpreting definitions, metaphors, models, constructions, types, or ideals. They 
cannot be recovered by attempts, no matter how thoughtful, to specify an examinable practice 
by detailing a generality. (p. 16)
We should not shy away from sources of ‘trouble’ (Lynch, 2011: 931–932; Garfinkel, 
1984 [1967]) where fraught understandings between participants and researchers force 
issues more fully into the open. Surely, this is likely to yield more valuable data than if 
we quietly exit the field, fearful that we might be discredited in the eyes of our partici-
pants and only thankful to have momentarily ‘passed’ (Goffman, 1963). If we truly wish 
to share the voices and perspectives of researched actors and communities, we should 
question unfamiliar narratives and seek clarity on their significance before conveying 
them, rather than misunderstanding them but trying to convey them anyway.
The second, related implication of this approach would be to re-evaluate some of our 
typical institutional approaches to certain ethical and safeguarding norms, including a 
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more nuanced approach to harm. From most institutional ethical review perspectives, 
successfully entering and exiting research fields hinges almost entirely on our ability to 
do no harm (McGowan, 2020: 8). This should, of course, remain an absolute ethical 
requisite of any project – to the extent that it should almost go without saying. However, 
we suspect that such an imperative has perhaps created a number of unintended conse-
quences for researchers, whereby the ‘do no harm’ principle has caused us to sometimes 
lose sight of our responsibility to seek a deeper understanding of the research field than 
when we entered it. As a deeply personal and sometimes quite private sphere of people’s 
lives, religion is often perceived to constitute a quintessentially ‘sensitive research topic’ 
(Renzetti and Lee, 1993), which should not be challenged, questioned, or interrogated.
In our view, however, understanding a research field and doing no harm should mutu-
ally overlap, not sit dichotomously opposed. Seeking clarity, explanation, or elaboration 
from participants can be done without causing distress, alarm, or annoyance, just as we 
might broach somewhat ‘sensitive’ discussion areas in other routine settings. It can be 
done without causing ‘harm’ in an ethical sense, yet failing to pursue discussion in this 
way may not be so ingenuous if we go away and misrepresent people’s accounts, pre-
senting them simply to ‘speak for themselves’. One danger of an excessively risk-averse 
approach to ‘doing ethical research’, including exploring beliefs we are not committed to 
ourselves, is that the misreading of accounts of minority and often marginalised groups 
is potentially exacerbated. We should not simply be looking at the text our fieldwork 
produces, but the context in which the narrative was produced, the exchanges and inter-
actions leading to that point, including points of confusion or incertitude.
As we have reiterated, to ignore the importance of moments of incertitude in favour 
of ‘getting on’ with the analysis at hand is to divorce notions of reflexivity from its eve-
ryday and practical nature. The ‘epistemic virtue’ (Lynch, 2000) this claims, if only 
implicitly, in fact risks a strange sort of ‘objectivised ignorance’ whereby researchers can 
distance themselves from the very source of their data, often to give the impression of 
systematicity or rigour (see Rawls, 2002: 27). However, the practices of co-construction 
found within in-depth interview techniques highlights that researchers and research data 
are intimately connected. Researchers experiencing difficulty in understanding the sig-
nificance of their data by trying to establish yet more distance away from it may see this 
gap between comprehensible, and comprehensively documented, experience widen.
Conclusion
In this article, we have utilised religious experiences reported to us as interesting examples 
which illuminate broader issues of sociological and methodological significance. The data 
extracts discussed here were articulated by people, in part, for their distinctly ‘storyable’ 
possibilities (Sacks, 1992: 218). Yet these narratives represent second-order phenomena and 
are not themselves reproductions of the experiences being relayed. Unlike out-of-body 
experiences or visceral emotions – the subject of some of our participants’ stories – the nar-
ratives themselves were articulated in plainly comprehensible (i.e. understandable) ways. 
While original experiences contained within these narratives may be out of any shared onto-
logical grasp, our participants’ stories were rendered according to shared conversational and 
interactional convention. To conflate these two elements (i.e. original experiences and sto-
ries to which they now belong) would be analytically and ethically erroneous.
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There is an important difference between comprehension as knowing what someone 
else is describing to you based on ontologically tacit knowledge that you identify with 
based on past transcendental experiences, and recognising what someone else is describ-
ing to you based on a shared framework of ordinary language which renders the stories 
they tell about themselves externally intelligible or comprehensible despite inner doubts, 
questions, confusion, or scepticism you might privately harbour. To discuss participants’ 
experiences as the former, when we might only recognise the significance of their stories 
as a result of the latter, is perhaps disingenuous and abstract. If our task is to document 
the voices of our participants, then we must do so demonstrably. While researchers often 
share tacit emotions with their participants, something we seldom know unless they offer 
more detail for us to see (see, for example, Wakeman, 2014), those that do not are still 
responsible for offering more transparent accounts.
Our accounts have been offered in recognition of this responsibility. However, we 
argue they are ultimately inadequate for withstanding thoroughgoing methodological 
scrutiny, exhibiting an insufficiently ‘detailed documentation of the research site’ (Rawls, 
2002: 27) for rigorously meaningful reconstruction. That said, the sort of narrative (re)
analysis made possible here by Sacks (1992) has usefully illuminated our data, going 
some way to reconciling the issues highlighted in our Introduction. As such, we have also 
problematised our past approaches to researching violence using interview data, vowing 
to pursue alternative approaches in the future where possible. If action, meaning, and 
understanding are inseparable elements of a demonstrable account of social order (Mair 
and Sharrock, 2019), then there is value in remaining openly inquisitive about world-
views other than our own and ‘working up’ these experiences in subsequent analysis. The 
notion of ‘privileging the data’ is an important one and consists of ‘unmotivated looking’ 
in data analysis and collection (Sacks, 1984).
This returns us to the salutary question: what counts as sociologically ‘see-able’? An 
insistence on empirically observable phenomena within future analysis need not equate 
to disenchantment in our own personal psyches, nor should it be misinterpreted as igno-
rance of, or disinterest in, contemporary expressions of religion and spirituality beyond 
our immediate grasp. Where and how we look for sociological answers when on spiritual 
terrain represents far too interesting a problem for such convenient conclusions. The 
writing up of our sociological research practice has much to gain from describing that 
which is comprehensible, documented as comprehensively as possible, while remaining 
ever curious about what might lie beyond our comprehension.
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